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Abstract 
Through a historical analysis of corporate law reforms in the 
United Kingdom (UK) during the twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries, this paper traces the shrinking scope for corporations to 
take socially responsible decisions. It offers a detailed examination 
of the rationales and drivers of the reforms, and shows that, by 
focusing exclusively on the question of accountability of directors 
to shareholders, wider social concerns were “bracketed” after 1948, 
leading to a permanent state of “crisis,” which constantly 
threatens the legitimacy of the corporate law system. Following the 
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Brexit vote, there are signs that the UK Government is willing to 
reconsider its historically narrow approach to corporate law by 
introducing some form of stakeholder representation. This paper 
concludes that such a change would be a more effective means of 
integrating social responsibility concerns into the corporate 
governance process than the current constrained voluntarist 
approach. 
I. Introduction 
This Article traces the shrinking scope of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) in UK company law from the beginning of 
the twentieth century. It shows that before 1948 company 
directors had broad discretion in law to balance the interests of 
different corporate constituencies, but that the cumulative effect 
of changes to the law since then has been to transfer ultimate 
control over corporations’ CSR policies from management to 
shareholders and capital markets. It concludes that shareholders 
now have an effective veto over the extent to which companies 
take wider interests into consideration, and suggests that this 
means that CSR does not currently offer an adequate means of 
internalizing externalities. If corporations are going to make a 
contribution to sustainability in its environmental, social and 
economic dimensions,1 there is a need for fundamental reforms to 
corporate law. 
The extensive debate about the function and scope of CSR 
tends to occur in isolation from the legal framing of managerial 
discretion within corporate law.2 Under the influence of 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade, U. OSLO (Mar. 1, 
2016), http://www.jus.uio.no/ifp/english/research/projects/smart/ (last updated 
Apr. 3, 2017) (last visited May 1, 2017) (detailing the possible contribution of 
corporations and other market actors to the achievement of sustainability in its 
three dimensions is the subject of the SMART project based at the University of 
Oslo) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 2. See, e.g., ANDREW CRANE, DIRK MATTEN & LAURA J. SPENCE, CORPORATE 
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: READINGS AND CASES IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 22–23 (2008) 
(noting that a debate occurred whether corporations should pursue the interests 
of the owners or interests of society as a whole); see also ANDREAS RÜHMKORF, 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAW AND GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 10–
11 (2015) (defining corporate social responsibility as “the acknowledgement by 
companies that they should be accountable not only for their financial 
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neoclassical law and economics, much of the literature since the 
1980s has tended to assume that companies will and should only 
engage in CSR activities where there is a “business case” for 
doing so, but without considering the role of the law in limiting 
CSR in this way.3 Lyman Johnson and David Millon’s work is an 
important exception within this debate and has consistently 
interrogated the narrow shareholder primacy focus of corporate 
law, the social costs theis creates, and the public demand for a 
wider scope of corporate law in order to ensure greater social 
responsibility. For example, they identified an incipient change 
with the emergence of corporate constituency states and other 
state laws making hostile takeovers more difficult,4 and, more 
recently, they argued that the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 
Inc.5 decision clarified that state law does not require 
corporations to maximize profits.6 Taking its lead from Johnson 
and Millon’s work, as so many others have done since the early 
1990s, this Article contributes to the debate by showing that the 
scope for CSR in UK corporate law has been shrinking since the 
middle of the twentieth century.  
In 1993, Millon wrote of the crisis arising from the 
uncertainty surrounding the normative foundations of corporate 
law in the United States and ongoing challenges to the model of 
shareholder primacy in particular.7 Whilst the British Parliament 
                                                                                                     
performance, but also for the impact of their activities on society and/or the 
environment”).  
 3. See Archie B. Carroll & Kareem M. Shabana, The Business Case for 
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review of Concepts, Research and Practice, 12 
INT’L J. MGMT. REV. 85, 86–87 (2010), http://f2.washington.edu/fm/sites/ 
default/files/Business%20Case%20for%20CSR%20Review%20of%20Concepts,%2
0Research%20and%20Practice.pdf  (discussing the modern take on CSR). 
 4. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State 
Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 848 (1989) (noting that state takeover 
laws aim to protect non-shareholders “from the disruptive impact of the 
corporate restructurings that are thought typically to result from hostile 
takeover”).  
 5. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 6. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby, 
70 BUS. LAW. 1, 7 (2014) (pointing out that on the contrary some companies 
operate in accordance with “sincerely held religious beliefs and moral 
principles”).  
 7. See David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in 
Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1993). 
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consistently sought to enhance the rights and interests of 
shareholders in corporate law, the crisis took longer to become 
manifest, perhaps because UK scholars began to question the 
normative foundations of their discipline considerably later than 
their counterparts in the United States. Where challenges to 
shareholder primacy did occur, as they did during the 1970s, with 
demands for industrial democracy, they were headed off with 
little other than cosmetic changes to the law. Nevertheless, that 
UK company law is in crisis is now abundantly clear. The driver 
of the crisis is the dynamic identified by Johnson, who argued 
that when, corporate law brackets out wider concerns in order to 
focus on one principal concern, the side effects become 
destructive.8 As legislators came to focus on director and 
managerial accountability to shareholders as the principal 
problem for corporate law to solve, the solutions to that problem, 
both within company law and in the wider corporate governance 
system, resulted in the emergence of new problems, namely 
corporate short-termism and a lack of meaningful social 
responsibility. The side-effects of the constant pressure on 
companies to produce shareholder value are becoming ever 
clearer—the ongoing environmental crisis demonstrates that 
sustainability cannot be achieved without a contribution from 
corporate law,9 whilst the financial crisis showed that external 
regulation will not protect society from excessive risk-taking in 
banks whilst executive incentives and shareholder pressure 
remain unchanged. Pressure is building from scholars, 
practitioners, and civil society in Europe for changes so that the 
corporate governance structure may be used to resolve, or at least 
contribute to the resolution of, these intractable global problems 
and to ensure environmental, social and economic 
sustainability.10 
                                                                                                     
 8. See Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & 
LEE. L. REV. 1713, 1715 (1993) (discussing the possibility that “the attempted 
closure within corporate law’s modest boundaries truly is a quasi-solution 
generating socially unacceptable residue problems”).  
 9. See generally COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL BARRIERS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES (Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin Richardson eds., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2015). 
 10. See, e.g., JEROEN VELDMAN, FILIP GREGOR & PAIGE MORROW, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE FOR A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT OF A GLOBAL ROUNDTABLE SERIES 
6–8 (2016), http://www.purposeofcorporation.org/corporate-governance-for-a-
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This Article traces the “bracketing” effect produced by 
reforms to UK corporate law, focusing on the reforms of 1948 and 
2006, and the abortive reforms of the 1970s, all of which were 
based on detailed public reviews of the scope of company law. The 
analysis shows that shareholder primacy was not inherent in 
corporate law, and that UK legislators and policy-makers worked 
very hard to ensure that the shareholder interest prevailed over 
the interests of other constituencies.11 It shows that one of the 
key effects of the changing scope of company law has been to 
transform CSR from an issue which, before 1948, fell almost 
entirely within the purview of management to one which is 
managerially-led, but over which shareholders and capital 
markets now have an effective veto. The 1948 reforms 
transformed corporate governance by giving the shareholders a 
right to remove any director by simple majority, regardless of any 
provisions in the company’s constitution. Five years after this 
change, the hostile takeover burst onto the scene, sidelining the 
previously dominant notion that managers ought to balance 
competing interests and focusing their attention on meeting the 
financial demands of shareholders.12 During the 1970s, pressures 
for industrial democracy, and employee board-level participation 
in particular, were successfully diffused in favor of a toothless 
duty for directors to consider the interests of employees.13 In 
2006, company law was reformed to remove any remaining 
ambiguity about the meaning of “the interests of the company,” 
requiring the directors to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members, the shareholders, but allowing them 
                                                                                                     
changing-world_report.pdf (recommending that the content of fiduciary duties, 
which include “the long-term success of the company, the focus on long-term 
sustainable value creation, stakeholder interests, and systematic risk” should be 
clarified in the corporation’s “governance documents, strategic objectives, and 
KPIs”). But see Lorraine Talbot, Trying to Save the World with Company Law: 
Some Problems, 36 LEGAL STUD. 513, 514–15 (2016) (describing a more skeptical 
view on whether corporate law can contribute to achieving these pressing social 
goals). 
 11. See infra note 149 and accompanying text (describing how § 172 of the 
Companies Act 2006 mandated that directors must prioritize shareholders’ 
interests). 
 12. See infra Part II (detailing a director’s objectives and goals before 
legislative reform in 1948). 
 13. See infra Part IV (discussing the Bullock Report and subsequent 
reforms).  
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to take account of a range of other interests as a means to this 
end.14 Introduced at the height of belief in the great moderation 
and the self-regulatory capacity of markets, the 2006 reforms 
were expected to put the question of the scope of company law to 
rest for a generation or more.15 However, the financial crisis of 
2008, and more recently, the historic referendum vote for Britain 
to leave the European Union, has called into question these 
comfortable assumptions and focused attention on the social costs 
which result from corporate law’s bracketing of wider interests. 
In a sign that the crisis has returned, two major consultations on 
corporate governance reform were launched in late 2016, the first 
“focusing on executive pay, directors’ duties, and the composition 
of boardrooms, including worker representation and gender 
balance in executive positions,”16 the second canvassing, among 
other things, different possibilities for the representation of 
stakeholder interests within corporate governance.17 Post-Brexit, 
there is considerable debate about the scope of corporate law in 
the UK, and it is possible that significant legislative changes will 
be introduced in the near future. If this happens, these changes 
may make it more likely that companies act in a more socially 
responsible manner, taking greater responsibility for their 
impacts on society. 
The Article is structured as follows: Part II discusses the 
legal position before 1948. Part III looks at the reform process 
from 1945–1948, and the emergence of the hostile takeover. Part 
IV considers the reforms of the late 1970s. Part V explores the 
                                                                                                     
 14. See infra notes 145–158 and accompanying text (addressing the 
consequences that the enactment of § 172 had on company law).  
 15. See infra Part IV (discussing how the reform only created more 
questions than it solved). 
 16. Corporate Governance Inquiry Launch, PARLIAMENT (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/business-energy-industrial-strategy/news-parliament-2015/corporate-
governance-inquiry-launch-16-17/ (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Corporate Governance Inquiry—
Publications, PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees 
/committees-a-z/commons-select/business-energy-industrial-
strategy/inquiries/parliament-2015/corporate-governance-inquiry/publications/ 
(last visited May 1, 2017) (tracking the responses to the consultation) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 17. See generally DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY, & INDUS. STRATEGY, CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE REFORM, GREEN PAPER 34–42 (Nov. 16). 
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2006 reforms. The conclusion reviews the current position and 
canvasses the prospect of imminent reforms to UK corporate law. 
II. The Law Before 1948 
Because of its origins in partnership law, UK company law 
was always understood to be shareholder-centric. The law 
required that directors’ decisions be oriented towards the 
interests of the company, with one judge famously stating that, 
“[t]he law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but 
there are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for 
the benefit of the company.”18 The notion of the “interests of the 
company” was generally interpreted by commentators as 
referring to the commercial interests of the shareholders rather 
than the interests of the separate legal entity,19 although it was 
clear that the law allowed the directors to take account of and 
spend money on interests other than those of shareholders, 
provided this was “reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the 
business of the company.”20 Recently, a number of scholars have 
challenged the conventional understanding of this line of case law 
by arguing that the interests of the company were never defined 
by the courts and that these decisions turned on the narrow point 
that gratuitous payments were void for ultra vires because they 
                                                                                                     
 18. Hutton v. West Cork Ry. Co. [1883] 23 Ch. Div. 654, 673; see also Parke 
v. Daily News [1962] Ch. 927, 963 (ruling that a company could not pay 
gratuities to its employees once it had agreed to sell its business and enter 
liquidation).  
 19. See, e.g., J. E. PARKINSON, CORPORATE POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
ISSUES IN THE THEORY OF COMPANY LAW 77 [1993] (“The correct position is thus 
that the corporate entity is a vehicle for benefiting the interests of a specified 
group or groups. These interests the law has traditionally defined as the 
interests of the shareholders.”); see also L.S. Sealy, Directors’ “Wider” 
Responsibilities—Problems, Conceptual, Practical, and Procedural, 13 MONASH 
U. L. REV. 164, 165 (1987) (noting that in the Victorian times the company was 
regarded as an association of members rather than a legal entity, meaning that 
the company was a “they” and not “it”).  
 20. Hutton, 23 Ch. Div. at 671; see also Evans v Brunner, Mond & Co. Ltd. 
[1921] 1 Ch. 359 (finding that a donation to fund scientific education in 
universities was legal because the board deemed the donation “essential”); 
Hampson v. Price’s Patent Candle Co. (1876) 45 L. J. Ch. 437 (finding that the 
directors’ decision to pay a gratuitous bonus to the company’s employees was 
legal).  
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were not reasonably incidental to the business objectives specified 
in the company’s memorandum.21 Marc Moore argues that the 
correct interpretation of these cases is that “corporate funds could 
legitimately be devoted to shareholders and/or employees as the 
directors reasonably deemed fit for the furtherance of the 
company’s constitutionally specified line(s) of business, so long as 
the interests of the business as such were genuinely being 
promoted in some way.”22 This is an important reinterpretation of 
the case law because, as we will see next, it accords with the 
broad discretion accorded to company directors by the law before 
1948. 
One reason why the precise contours of managerial 
discretion, and, in particular, the distinction between considering 
stakeholders as a means to the end of shareholder gain and 
considering them as an end in themselves, were never explored 
by the courts is that, in the past, it was very difficult for 
shareholders to challenge managerial decisions. Provided that a 
decision was not ultra vires, the courts applied a protean business 
judgment rule, insisting only that decisions be taken by directors 
in good faith in what they consider—not what a court may 
consider—as in the interests of the company, which once again 
was undefined,23 and applying a strong presumption that 
decisions were taken in good faith.24 In addition, there were 
                                                                                                     
 21. See, e.g., Marc T. Moore, Shareholder Primacy, Labour and the Historic 
Ambivalence of UK Company Law 19 (Univ. of Cambridge Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 40/2016, 2016) (equating the court’s 
decision to invalidate these payments with a court’s decision to invalidate 
dividend payments when the company has no distributable profits); Jonathan 
Mukwiri, Myth of Shareholder Primacy in English Law, 24 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 
217, 237–238 (2013) (arguing that the “corporate governance of English public 
companies is based on the entity principle”). 
 22. Moore, supra note 21, at 18.  
 23. See In re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [1942] Ch. 304 (concerning the 
directors’ exercise of their power to refuse to register share transfers, rather 
than a challenge to a managerial decision). 
 24. See Gresham Life (1872) L.R. 8 Ch. App. 446. The author is not aware 
of any examples of cases in which a shareholder rebutted the presumption and 
successfully challenged a managerial decision on this basis. In Tomkinson v. 
South-Eastern Ry. Co. (1887) 35 Ch. Div. 675, a shareholder did successfully 
challenge a decision by a railway company to contribute to the establishment of 
the Imperial Institute in London on the grounds that this would “very probably 
greatly increase the traffic of this company.” Id. However, the basis of the 
decision was that this was ultra vires because it “clearly would not be a proper 
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procedural restrictions on the availability of the derivative action, 
which made it difficult for a shareholder to bring an action for 
breach of duty against the directors.25 
The combined effect of these legal doctrines and lacunae 
meant that there was little pressure on directors from litigation 
to manage companies exclusively with a view to producing 
shareholder value. There were, however, two commonly used 
constitutional mechanisms by which the directors were 
encouraged to serve the ultimate interests of the shareholders. 
First, it was common to include a requirement that directors 
hold qualification shares, and there is no doubt that this brought 
the interests of shareholders into greater focus.26 
Second, the shareholders could remove the directors in 
accordance with the company’s articles, although by default this 
required a special resolution—75% of the votes cast in the general 
meeting—something that would normally be very difficult to 
achieve.27 Company constitutions also commonly further 
                                                                                                     
application of the moneys of a railway company.” Id. The judge commented that 
to argue that “any expenditure which may indirectly conduce to the benefit of 
the company is intra vires, seems to me extravagant.” Id.  
 25. See, e.g., Foss v. Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 463 (finding that 
corporations should normally sue in their own name, but that an exception may 
be made in the interests of justice where there is ‘injury to a corporation by 
some of its members, for which no adequate remedy remained’); Atwool v. 
Merryweather (1867) 5 Eq. 464, 467 (developing the possible exception by 
finding that “‘it would not be competent for a majority of the shareholders 
against a minority’ to sanction a fraudulent transaction”). 
 26. See Gareth Campbell & John D. Turner, Substitutes for Legal 
Protection: Corporate Governance and Dividends in Victorian Britain, 64 ECON. 
HIST. REV. 571, 582 (2011) (noting that the majority of companies placed share 
qualifications upon their directors). 
 27. See PALMER, supra note 26, at 195–97 (noting that the default rule 
provided by Table A was that directors could only be removed by special 
resolution (Art 65 Table A 1862) or extraordinary resolution (Art 86 Table A 
1906; Art 80 Table A 1929), both types of resolution requiring the support of 
seventy-five percent of those entitled to vote and actually voting in person or by 
proxy). A special resolution also required a second meeting to confirm the 
decision by simple majority until 1929. See id. at 193 (dispensing with the 
requirement of a second meeting for a special resolution). Shareholders in listed 
companies were not necessarily in a better position; even by 1945, the London 
Stock Exchange only required that all directors of listed companies could be 
removed by extraordinary resolution. Minutes of Evidence Before the Cohen 
Committee, Appendix X at 350; see also Lance Davis, Larry Neal & Eugene N. 
White, How It All Began: The Rise of Listing Requirements on the London, 
Berlin, Paris, and New York Stock Exchanges, 38 INT’L J. ACCT. 117, 135 (setting 
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weakened the accountability of directors to shareholders because 
of the default rule, going back to the Joint Stock Companies Act 
1844, that boards were “staggered” with one third of the directors 
required to retire each year but available for re-election.28 
Shareholders who wanted to remove directors outside of this cycle 
had to muster support for an extraordinary resolution, which was 
difficult because the directors themselves tended to hold all the 
proxies for the general meeting.29 Completing the picture of 
strong managerial discretion, coupled with peripheral and weak 
shareholders, was the courts’ refusal to allow the shareholders to 
give instructions to the directors by simple majority.30 
Hence, directors and managers had very broad discretion in 
law, and this discretion widened further from the beginning of 
the twentieth century as shareholders gradually became more 
dispersed, whilst directors increasingly delegated management to 
professional managers.31 Some five years before Berle and Means’ 
seminal analysis of the United States, Keynes remarked upon a 
“most interesting and unnoticed”32 development in the largest 
companies, in “which the owners of the capital, i.e. its 
shareholders, are almost entirely dissociated from the 
management with the result that the direct personal interest of 
                                                                                                     
out the early rules and regulations of the London Stock Exchange). 
 28. Companies Act 1862, tbl. A, arts. 58 & 60 (UK); Companies Act 1906, 
tbl. A, arts 78 & 80 (UK); Companies Act 1929, tbl. A, arts. 73 & 75 (UK). 
 29. Observation of Justice Cohen in minutes of evidence before the Cohen 
Committee, para. 7071. Minutes of evidence taken before the Company Law 
Amendment Committee, 17th September 1943–24th November 1944 (HMSO, 
1943–1944). 
 30. See, e.g., Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. v. Cuninghame 
(1906) 2 Ch. 34, § IV (noting that if certain powers are given to directors, then 
shareholders cannot interfere with “the exercise of those powers”); Gramophone 
& Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley (1908) 2 K.B. 89, 105–106 (“The directors are not 
servants to obey directions given by the shareholders as individuals; . . . They 
are persons who may by the regulations be entrusted with the control of the 
business, and if so entrusted they can be dispossessed from that control only by 
the statutory majority which can alter the articles.”). 
 31. See JOHN M. KEYNES, THE END OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE (1926) (noting that 
there comes a point in the company’s existence during which directors “are 
entirely dissociated from the management” because the company grew too large, 
and at that point directors begin to look at outside professional help). 
32. Id.  
THE SHRINKING SCOPE OF CSR 1011 
the latter in the making of great profit becomes quite 
secondary”33 so that enterprises were becoming socialized.34  
The emergence of professionalized management during the 
first half of the twentieth century had brought with it an ideology 
of control, which asserted that the function of management was 
to balance competing interests within the corporate enterprise. 
Beginning with technical discussions of the role of the manager in 
guiding production,35 this ideology quickly developed into the 
doctrine of scientific management, perhaps most closely 
associated with Taylor,36 and the ideology received the seal of 
approval of the British government in 1919, in large part because 
it promised to tame the conflict between labor and capital.37 At 
the same time, the idea began to emerge that management was 
developing into a profession,38 an impartial leadership group 
                                                                                                     
33. Id.  
 34. See id. (noting that when this stage is reached, directors consider with 
more regard the reputation of the institution than they consider the 
maximization of profit for the shareholders).   
 35. See FRANCIS G. BURTON, THE COMMERCIAL MANAGEMENT OF 
ENGINEERING WORKS 20–25 (1899) (describing that the role of the manager 
cannot be defined because “he is an autocrat, controlling and directing everyone 
connected with the concern”); see also J. SLATER LEWIS, THE COMMERCIAL 
ORGANISATION OF FACTORIES 7–11 (1896) (detailing the qualifications and 
necessary responsibilities of a manager). 
 36. See FREDERICK W. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT 
7–11 (1911) (arguing that the remedy for inefficiency, which affects society, lies 
in systematic management).  
 37. See Scientific Business Management, Reconstruction Problems 28, 
Ministry of Reconstruction (HMSO, London 1919) (emphasizing the human 
aspects of management noting “Taylor’s cardinal principle of a mental 
revolution in employer and worker alike and of their mutuality of interest.” 
Managers should “guide and stimulate them [the employees] towards a higher 
standard of intellectuality and efficiency in life” and ”cultivate the personal 
interest of the workers.”)  
 38. See, e.g., SIDNEY WEBB, THE WORKS MANAGER TO-DAY: AN ADDRESS 
PREPARED FOR A SERIES OF PRIVATE GATHERINGS OF WORKS MANAGERS 4–5 (1918) 
(“In large establishments it demands the undivided attention, not only of one 
person but of a whole class; and we see evolved specialised and differentiated 
hierarchy . . . .”). Webb recognized that “the profession of the manager, under 
whatever designation, is destined, with the ever increasing complication of 
man’s enterprises, to develop a steadily increasing technique and a more and 
more specialised vocational training of its own.” Id. at 8. A similar current of 
thought was developing in the United States. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, 
BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 1–6 (1914) (defining an occupation as a profession 
where it requires intellectual training, “is pursued largely for others and not 
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which would produce “an actual and living organism in which 
each living unit is compelled, and is glad to be compelled, to offer 
his best,”39 and a public service obligation.40 Industrialists, such 
as Seebohm Rowntree, as well as early management theorists, 
saw managers as holding a balance between labor and capital in 
pursuit of public or social responsibility.41 When Berle and Means 
concluded that the control of the great corporations might 
“develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of 
claims by various groups in the community,”42 they were 
reflecting the previous forty years of debate about the role of 
management in productive enterprise, debates that had occurred 
in parallel in the US and the UK. This conception of management 
became widely accepted,43 and as late as 1955, Gower commented 
that “it has become almost an accepted dogma that management 
owed duties to ‘the four parties to industry’ (labor, capital, 
management, and the community)—a dogma which is repeated 
                                                                                                     
merely for one’s self” and in which “the amount of financial return is not the 
accepted measure of success”).  
 39. JOHN LEE, MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 16 
(1921).  
 40. See R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 122–23 (1921) (using 
agriculture as an example to show that the small capital required for 
agriculture makes it possible for a group of workers to offer their services to the 
public “without the intervention of an employer”). For industry to be organized 
as a profession, “it should cease to be conducted by the agents of 
property-owners for the advantage of property-owners, and should be carried on, 
instead, for the service of the public” and “the responsibility for the maintenance 
of the service should rest upon the shoulders of those, from organizer and 
scientist to labourer, by whom, in effect, the work is conducted.” Id. at 111. 
Similar debates were occurring in the United States during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century. See, e.g., ALLEN KAUFMAN, LAWRENCE 
ZACHARIAS & MARVIN KARSON, MANAGERS VS. OWNERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CORPORATE CONTROL IN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 114–17 (1995); see also Mary 
O’Sullivan, CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 100–02 (2000) (describing the 
evolution of these debates in the United States).  
 41. See JOHN CHILD, BRITISH MANAGEMENT THOUGHT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
52–53 (1969) (arguing that a professional claim for management developed, 
which included the concept of impartiality in the “pursuit of a public or social 
responsibility”).  
 42. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDNER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 356 (1991).  
 43. See Paul Bircher, Company Law Reform and the Board of Trade, 18 
ACCT. & BUS. RES. 107, 117 (2012) (“[T]he rapidly developing sense that industry 
is less a matter of the adventuring of private money for profit than the 
rendering of a public service to the commonwealth.”).  
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indiscriminately in the speeches of right-wing company chairmen 
and left-wing politicians.”44  
These wider social responsibilities of management were 
never enshrined in UK corporate law, but were not clearly 
incompatible with it, and the outer limits of the law were never 
tested before the courts. While directors were under a duty to act 
intra vires and in good faith in the interests of the company, these 
elastic notions certainly accommodated any socially responsible 
decision-making that was capable of producing returns for the 
shareholders, and, as discussed above, may well have gone 
further. 
III. The Company Law Reforms of 1948 
This was the background against which, in 1943, a 
Committee on Company Law Amendment (known as the Cohen 
Committee after its chairman) was appointed to review the UK’s 
system of company law.45 The Cohen Committee was asked “to 
consider and report what major amendments are desirable in the 
Companies Act, 1929, and, in particular, to review the 
requirements prescribed in regard to the formation and affairs of 
companies and the safeguards afforded for investors and for the 
public interest.”46 However, the Committee focused most of its 
attention on the protection of shareholders,47 and there was no 
explicit consideration of how the law could provide further 
safeguards for the public interest. Its 1945 Report recommended 
many significant changes to company law, including modernizing 
accounting, prohibiting the use of hidden reserves (so making 
share prices more reliable), and introducing a new remedy for 
                                                                                                     
 44. L. C. B. Gower, Corporate Control: The Battle for the Berkeley, 68 HARV. 
L. REV. 1176, 1190 (1955).  
 45. See BD. OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW 
AMENDMENT 7–8 (Cmd. 6659 1943), http://reports.mca.gov.in/Reports/17-
Justice%20Cohen%20committee%20report%20of%20the%20committee%20on%2
0company%20law%20amendment,%201943.pdf (detailing general economic 
policy as it relates to company law). 
 46. Id. at 7. 
 47. See id. at 10–12 (noting that ultra vires protection has proven to be 
illusory for shareholders).  
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minority shareholders.48 However, for our purposes, its most 
important innovation related to the relationship between 
shareholders and directors. The Cohen committee was influenced 
strongly by the emergent separation of ownership and control, 
and expressed concern that shareholder control had become 
illusory as “small shareholders who pay little attention to their 
investments so long as satisfactory dividends are forthcoming.”49 
Key members of the Committee, such as the Chairman, Mr. 
Justice Cohen, and Professor Goodhart, simply assumed that 
shareholders ought to have more control over directors.50 The 
Committee ultimately concluded that it was “desirable to give 
shareholders greater powers to remove directors with whom they 
are dissatisfied, than they have at present”51 and proposed to 
introduce “a provision, overriding anything to the contrary in the 
articles of a company, that any director, whether under a service 
contract or not, should be removable by an ordinary resolution, 
without prejudice to any contractual right for compensation.”52  
This change generated little debate in Parliament or in the 
academic literature,53 and the Labour Party, which was focused 
                                                                                                     
 48. See id. at 72.  
“We propose that the accounts of subsidiaries should be required as 
far as practicable to be consolidated with, and to be made up to the 
same date as, the accounts of the holding company, but that there 
should be excluded the accounts of subsidiaries which in the opinion 
of the directors of the holding company it would be impracticable or 
misleading to consolidate.”  
 49. Id. at 9. 
 50. See Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Company Law Amendment 
Committee, 17th September 1943–24th November 1944 (HMSO, 1943–1944). For 
example, Cohen commented that “[t]he view upon which company law is based, I 
think, is that the shareholders elect the directors to conduct their business” 
(para. 7038) and asked “[i]s it not reasonable prima facie that the shareholders 
out of whose money the remuneration comes, should know what the directors 
are receiving?” (para. 9741). He also asked whether those upon whom the first 
loss falls should have greater control (para. 10205). Similarly, Goodhart 
observed that he considered “the question of shareholders’ control” to be “really 
the most important point in company law,” because “in theory the shareholders 
have complete control through electing the directors.” (para. 9479). 
 51. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW AMENDMENT, supra note 
45, at 79.  
 52. Id. at 80.  
 53. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Report of the Committee on Company Law 
Amendment, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1258–1265 (1945) (suggesting that one of the 
major flaws of American corporate law “is the failure to devise an effective 
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on its plans to nationalize swathes of British industry, barely 
engaged with the process of company law reform.54 Yet, it is no 
exaggeration to state that the Companies Act 1948 ushered in the 
modern era of financialized shareholder primacy corporate 
governance. Before 1948, the hostile takeover was virtually 
unknown because there were significant obstacles to takeover 
bids that bypassed the board of directors and were addressed 
directly to the shareholders.55 The bidder had to offer a very high 
price so that “the directors could not say that the bid was 
inadequate.”56 Shareholders, who had little reliable information 
about the company’s financial position, tended to follow the 
recommendation of the directors as to whether to accept a bid 
from an outsider.57 Most significantly, there was a fundamental 
asymmetry between incumbent directors who only had to control 
directly or through other supportive shareholders 25% of the 
shares in order to prevent a bid of which they did not approve and 
bidders who had to acquire 75% of the shares to take control of 
the general meeting and change the board.58 As a result, 
                                                                                                     
remedy for misconduct on the part of those in control of a corporation”); O. 
Kahn-Freund, Company Law Reform: A Review of the Report of the Committee 
on Company Law Amendment, 9 MOD. L. REV. 235, 238 (1946) (“The Committee 
did not embark upon an investigation of the corporate entity principle as such 
and of its implications.”).  
 54. See Ben Clift, Andrew Gamble & Michael Harris, The Labour Party and 
the Company, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY 51, 63–64 (John E. 
Parkinson et al. ed., 2000). 
 55. See James B. Tabb, Accountancy Aspects of the Takeover Bids in 
Britain 1945–1965 2 (Jan. 1, 1968) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Sheffield) (citing the technique used by George Hudson, nineteenth century 
railway owner, who would select “a railway company with declining profits, 
purchase shares or stock in the company and attend a general meeting where he 
would expound a scheme to increase the company’s profits if the shareholders 
would replace the existing board”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 56. Id. at 11. 
 57. See id. at 1 (“Directors not wishing their companies to be taken over 
have developed a variety of defensive measures . . . steps taken before a bid has 
been made for the company and ad hoc measures to stave off an actual offer.”). 
 58. See PALMER, supra note 26, at 195–197 (noting that the default rule 
provided by Table A was that directors could only be removed by special 
resolution (Art 65 Table A 1862) or extraordinary resolution (Art 86 Table A 
1906; Art 80 Table A 1929), both types of resolution requiring the support of 
seventy-five percent of those entitled to vote and actually voting in person or by 
proxy). 
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consensual mergers were the norm, and hostile takeovers were 
virtually unheard of. Where they did occur, they were motivated 
by an industrial, and generally anticompetitive, logic.59 
However, from the early 1950s, shortly after the 
implementation of the Cohen Committee’s reforms in the form of 
§ 184 Companies Act 1948, a wave of hostile takeovers struck 
British companies.60 Indeed, between 1948 and 1961, 25% of 
companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange were taken over 
by other quoted companies.61 By leveling the playing field 
between incumbents and outsiders, the 1948 changes completely 
changed the dynamics of takeovers by making it much more 
difficult for company directors to resist takeovers and opening up 
a wide range of companies to hostile takeover for the first time. 
The threat of hostile takeover changed managerial practices very 
quickly. Whilst some companies took defensive measures,62 
others tried to persuade their shareholders not to sell their 
shares by increasing the dividend, 63 or by taking actions similar 
to that of a bidder, such as selling off the company’s freeholds to 
an insurance company and leasing them back.64  
Although Hannah has emphasized the importance of the 
accounting regime in allowing bidders to identify suitable 
targets,65 the argument above suggests that § 184 played a key 
role in allowing the hostile takeover to become an established 
                                                                                                     
59. See Tabb, supra note 55, at 12 (noting that a rare hostile takeover 
occurred in 1920, when Lever, who had failed to persuade his competitors to 
form a cartel with him, made an offer so generous that the board of John Knight 
Ltd. felt compelled to recommend that their shareholders accept). 
 60. See GEORGE BULL & ANTHONY VICE, BID FOR POWER 29–32 (1961) 
(describing how Charles Clore launched the first hostile takeover bids in 1953 
for the Savoy Hotel and Sears).  
 61. Les Hannah, Takeover Bids in Britain Before 1950: An Exercise in 
Business ‘Pre-History’, 16 BUS. HIST. 65, 67 (2006). 
 62. See BULL & VICE, supra note 60, at 35–38 (explaining how the directors 
of Savoy Hotel Ltd. sought to frustrate Clore’s bid by preventing him from 
changing the use of the Berkeley Hotel). 
 63. See id. at 21 (showing that there was a small but significant increase in 
the percentage and quantity of payments of profits to shareholders between 
1953 and 1956). 
 64. See Tabb, supra note 55, at 62 (describing the case of Waterlow & Sons 
Ltd. in 1962 that sold off its head office and distributed the proceeds to 
shareholders in order to head off an unwelcome takeover).  
 65. See generally Hannah, supra note 61. 
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practice. Whilst there was significant opposition at first, its 
legitimacy was no longer questioned by policy-makers after the 
mid-1950s.66 It gradually gained approval, first from 
commentators,67 then from the City of London and the Bank of 
England.68 In 1962, the Jenkins Committee,69 which conducted 
another of the UK’s periodic reviews of company law, also gave 
broad approval to takeovers as “an essential feature of economic 
growth and development” and a “convenient method of 
amalgamation.”70 A minority of that Committee, led by Gower—
the leading company law professor at the time—added the 
further gloss that takeovers were a spur to managerial 
efficiency.71 By 1963, the efficiency-enhancing effects of takeovers 
were beginning to be theorized by economists72 and, in 1965, 
                                                                                                     
66. See David Chambers, The City and the Corporate Economy Since 1970, 
in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN 255, 267 (Floud et 
al. ed., 2014) (noting both how the government and the Bank of England 
initially expressed opposition to hostile takeovers and how companies struggled 
to obtain finances to expand; therefore, the takeover technique was slow to 
spread). 
 67. See Tabb, supra note 55, at 256 (citing an argument by The Economist 
that directors using the company’s resources for the best economic return were 
immune from takeover, and that bidders making better use of those resources 
would “generally be performing an economic service to the community”); see also 
Gower, supra note 44, at 1396 (describing the takeover mechanism as “useful”); 
see also BULL & VICE, supra note 60, at 26–27 (backing the argument that “the 
bidder makes the most efficient use of a company’s assets,” whilst “many boards 
in the past have tended to adopt excessively long-term schedules.”).  
 68. See Richard Roberts, Regulatory Responses to the Rise of the Market for 
Corporate Control in Britain in the 1950s, 34 BUS. HIST. 183, 187–91 (2006) (UK) 
(describing that in 1953, the Bank of England had expressed opposition to the 
emerging hostile takeover, but by 1958 gave its approval). 
 69. REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, 1962, Cmnd. 1749 (UK).  
 70. Id.  
 71. See id. at 209 (noting that “efficient directors who have treated their 
shareholders fairly and frankly should have little to fear from a raider” and they 
should not be allowed to protect themselves against this remote risk by issuing 
non-voting shares and “converting themselves into a self-perpetuating 
oligarchy”). 
 72. See Robin Marris, A Model of the “Managerial” Enterprise, 77(2) Q.J. 
ECON. 185, 190 (1963) (UK) (recognizing that the takeover was an essential 
means by which management control over the firm’s resources could be loosened 
and transferred to a more efficient controller). 
1018 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1001 (2017) 
Manne developed the notion of the market for corporate control in 
the United States.73 
The Cohen Committee’s changes greatly limited the scope for 
corporate social responsibility. Whilst managers still had 
considerable legal latitude to take account of, or balance, a range 
of social interests, they were in practice subject to considerable 
market pressure to prioritize returns to shareholders. The result 
was that social responsibility initiatives were only possible where 
they did not affect the market price of the company’s shares, 
opening the company to the threat of hostile takeover. Whilst 
managers were much less vocal about their social responsibilities 
after the effects of the 1948 changes became clear, we will see in 
the next section that social expectations regarding corporate 
responsibility did not go away; they simply changed form. 
IV. 1970s Industrial Democracy Reforms 
This Part traces how political pressure for industrial 
democracy during the 1970s ultimately resulted only in a 
toothless duty requiring directors to consider the interests of 
employees. Wedderburn notes that the British debate about 
corporate social responsibility “became in the 1970s a debate 
mainly about ‘industrial democracy.’”74 However, industrial 
democracy was “a banner carried not only by varied but often 
opposed groups,”75 comprising a variety of different demands, 
ranging from greater trade union involvement in decisions,76 to 
                                                                                                     
 73. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 
J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965) (“A fundamental premise underlying the market 
for corporate control is the existence of a high positive correlation between 
corporate managerial efficiency and the market price of shares of that 
company.”).  
 74. Lord Wedderburn, The Legal Development of Corporate Responsibility: 
For Whom will Corporate Managers be Trustees?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
AND DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES 3, 32–33 (Klaus J. Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., De 
Gruyter 1985).  
 75. Robert Kilroy-Silk, Contemporary Theories of Industrial Democracy, 41 
POL. Q. 169, 180 (1970).   
 76. See Wedderburn, supra note 74, at 34–35. However, the Labour Party 
in 1967 insisted that industrial democracy should be achieved through a single 
channel of representation, that is, trade unions, with participation in a wider 
range of decisions based on information and recognition. See generally LABOUR 
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experiments with worker representatives on boards,77 to legally 
mandated worker directors.78 
Under the Conservative government of the early 1970s, the 
strong opposition to industrial democracy on the part of 
management and the financial sector found expression in the 
Confederation of British Industry’s Watkinson Report.79 The 
group had been asked to “examine factors which might be 
expected to assist the direction and control of public companies, 
examine the role, responsibilities and structure of boards of 
public companies” and “consider corporate behaviour towards 
interests other than those of the shareholders and providers of 
finance, including employees, creditors, customers and the 
community at large.”80 Given the UK’s accession to the EEC in 
1973, the report strongly opposed the proposed Fifth Company 
Law Directive, which threatened to mandate German-style 
co-determination for all large companies.81 More importantly, it 
laid down a blueprint for both corporate governance and 
corporate social responsibility, which acted as a starting point for 
the Cadbury Committee,82 and so has endured to the present day. 
                                                                                                     
PARTY, REPORT OF THE LABOUR PARTY WORKING PARTY ON INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 
(1967). 
 77. See DONOVAN, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNION AND 
EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATIONS, 1968, Cmnd. 3623, at para 1004 (UK) [hereinafter 
DONOVAN REPORT] (detailing the recommendations of a minority to the Donovan 
Report). The Labour Government stated in January 1969 that it favored 
experiments with appointment of worker representatives to boards and would 
hold consultations as to how they might be facilitated. See IN PLACE OF STRIFE: A 
POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1969, Cmnd. 3888, at para 49 (UK). 
 78. See DONOVAN REPORT, supra note 77, para 1005, (a minority of the 
Committee calling for legislation that requires at least two workers’ directors to 
act as “guardians of the workers’ interest at the stage when company policy is 
being formulated . . . and should in all other respects exercise the rights and 
responsibilities of non-executive directors of companies to which they are 
appointed”).  
 79. See generally CONFEDERATION OF BRITISH INDUS., A NEW LOOK AT THE 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE BRITISH PUBLIC COMPANY: AN INTERIM REPORT FOR 
DISCUSSION (1973) [hereinafter WATKINSON REPORT].  
 80. Id. at 1. 
 81. See id. at 3 (proposing instead a two-tier board of directors). In large 
part as a result of British opposition, the Fifth Company Law Directive was 
never introduced.  
 82. See Minutes of the Second Meeting of the CBI Steering Group on Long-
Termism and Corporate Governance, CBI, http://cadbury.cjbs.archios. 
info/_media/files/CAD-01077.pdf (recording that Sir Adrian Cadbury stated that 
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It started from the (legally incorrect) premise that “companies are 
legally owned by their shareholders” and so “the paramount 
interest of the company must continue to be to serve the long 
term interests of the shareholders.”83 It recommended including 
non-executive directors on corporate boards as a means of 
bringing an outside perspective to the company and of reassuring 
shareholders and called for action be taken to encourage this.84 
However, out of enlightened self-interest and to ensure corporate 
integrity, directors should consider all relevant interests, 
including shareholders, employees, customers, creditors and the 
public,85 and should give more publicity to the fact that “they 
spend time and money on the public interest in ways not required 
by law and not offering early financial benefit.”86 These 
recommendations were reflected in a 1973 White Paper, which 
also recognized that company directors should “on behalf of the 
shareholders . . . discharge their social responsibilities” and 
therefore “have a manifest obligation towards all those with 
whom they have dealings—and none more so than the employees 
of the company.”87 Whilst a Green Paper was promised to address 
                                                                                                     
the Watkinson Report was “a useful starting point for his own study,” and that 
he asked the CBI Steering Group to suggest “a working definition of the term 
‘corporate governance’”).  
 83. WATKINSON REPORT, supra note 79, at 5.   
 84. See id. at 13 (stating that the arguments in favor of including non-
executive directors onto boards should be given wider publicity). This paralleled 
the SEC’s drive for more non-executives during the early 1970s. In the UK, a 
number of private member’s bills sought, between 1971 and 1976, to introduce 
this as a legal requirement. For example: “A bill to require certain companies to 
appoint non-executive directors; to require such directors jointly to present 
independent annual reports to the shareholders; and for purposes connected 
therewith.” 20th Century House of Commons Sessional Papers, 197–1972, Vol. I, 
at 385. Rhys Williams repeatedly sought to reintroduce his bill in the years that 
followed. See, e.g., 26 March 1975, Parl Deb HC vol. 889 (UK) at 509. 
 85. See id. at 6 (defining “enlightened self interest” as a balance between 
the company’s interests and that of others “in a way that a man of integrity and 
good will would do in the conduct of his own private business”); see also id. at 
16–17 (noting that each member of a board must consider interests such as 
those “of shareholders, of all employees, of customers, of creditors and the 
public”).  
 86. Id. at 24.   
 87. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, COMPANY LAW REFORM, 1973, 
Cmnd. 5391, at 5 (UK).  
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the question of employee participation, it appears that this was 
never published. 
With the re-election of a Labour Government in 1975, the 
pendulum apparently swung away from voluntary CSR and back 
towards employee representation, as the Bullock Committee was 
appointed with the mandate to consider how a “radical extension 
of industrial democracy into the control of companies by means of 
representation on boards of directors” could best be achieved.88 It 
ultimately recommended a 2x+y formulation, with shareholders 
and employees each appointing x directors, and the two groups 
jointly appointing y expert, co-opted directors.89 This would allow 
for deadlocks to be broken, but more importantly, the co-opted 
directors would bring the benefits of NEDs, in terms of external 
perspective, to the codetermined board.90 It recommended that 
codetermination should take place on a unitary board, provided 
that a sufficient majority of employees voted for it.91 A dissenting 
minority preferred to recommend a two-tier system, with the 
supervisory board consisting of one third each of employee 
representatives, shareholder representatives, and independent 
members.92 
Alongside this recommendation, the Report also suggested 
that “all directors should continue to be required to act in the best 
interests of the company, but that in doing so they should take 
into account the interests of the company’s employees as well as 
                                                                                                     
 88. DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ON 
INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1977, Cmnd. 6706 (UK) [hereinafter BULLOCK REPORT]. 
See James Moher & Alastair Reid, Democracy in the Workplace—The Bullock 
Report Revisited, HIST. & POL’Y (June 9, 2010), 
http://www.historyandpolicy.org/trade-union-forum/meeting/democracy-in-the-
workplace-the-bullock-report-revisited (last visited May 1, 2017) (discussing the 
historical background leading up to the Bullock Committee) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 89. See id. (balancing the ideologies of the trade unions and the 
shareholders).  
 90.  See BULLOCK REPORT, supra note 88, at 97, 98 (discussing the 
advantages of the Committee’s recommendations in terms of avoiding 
shareholder factions and deadlock). 
 91.  See id. at 161 (“[W]e believe that all employees should be involved in a 
ballot and that if a sufficient majority is obtained, then the process of 
reconstituting the board should take place.”). 
 92. See id. at 178 (detailing the Dissent’s proposed composition of the 
Supervisory Board).  
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its shareholders.”93 This reform was considered “long overdue, 
whether or not employee representatives are put on boards.”94 
This proposed change reflected the Committee’s understanding 
that the role of company directors was one of “balancing a 
number of interests.”95 This would not change when employees 
were represented on boards, and directors would still be required 
“to weigh up the differing and conflicting interests in the 
company in order to reach decisions which they genuinely believe 
to be in the company’s overall best interest.”96 
The UK Labour Government responded to Bullock in a 1978 
White Paper emphasizing the importance of giving employees “a 
share in the decisions within their company or firm, and 
therefore a share in the responsibility for making it a success” 
because this would replace “defensive co-existence” with a 
“positive partnership between management and workers.”97 It 
proposed to make a two-tier board an option, with employee and 
shareholder representatives on the “policy board” setting pay, 
monitoring performance, supervising the financial affairs and so 
on, whilst day-to-day management would be carried out by the 
management board.98 The precise scope of employee participation 
was to be determined through negotiations, with a statutory right 
to board level representation in companies employing more than 
2,000 employees where no agreement was reached after a number 
of years.99 As for the composition of the board, it suggested that, 
in light of ongoing disagreements, “[a] reasonable first step would 
                                                                                                     
 93. Id. at 84.  
 94. Id. at 62. Similar proposals had been made in the abortive Companies 
Bills of 1973 (permissive) and 1976 and in the Industrial Democracy Bill 1975, 
which would have required directors to consider employee interests, as well as 
employee representation on boards. Whilst this bill had strong support, it was 
aborted when the government announced its intention to introduce legislation 
on industrial democracy in 1976–77. See Ben Clift, Andrew Gamble & Michael 
Harris, The Labour Party and the Company, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE 
COMPANY 51, 75 (John Parkinson, Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly eds., 2000) 
(providing the political history of various Companies Bills). 
 95. BULLOCK REPORT, supra note 88, at 85.  
 96. Id.  
 97. INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, 1978, Cmnd. 7231, ¶ 1 (UK).  
 98. See id. ¶ 24 (outlining the proposed two-tiered board structure).  
 99. See id. ¶¶ 26–27 (proposing a structure of employee board participation 
and a three to four-year timeframe in which these decisions should be made).  
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be to give employees the right to appoint up to one third of the 
members of the policy board in the proposed two tier system.”100  
These proposals fell off the agenda during the Winter of 
Discontent of 1978–79, and the Labour Government was replaced 
by a Conservative one in 1979.101 However, the proposal to 
require directors to consider employee interests remained live. 
The proposal had been included in a proposed statutory 
statement of directors’ duties,102 and in the Companies Bill 1978, 
which envisaged the provision operating as a safe harbor for 
company directors in proceedings for breach of duty, although it 
never became law.103 Despite the change of government, the 
provision was introduced as Section 46(1) of the Companies Act 
1980, which ultimately became Section 309(1) of Companies Act 
1985. It stated that: 
                                                                                                     
 100. Id. ¶ 32. This essentially adopted the position taken by the minority in 
the Bullock Report, and was driven by rifts within the Labour Party as to the 
effect of industrial democracy on business confidence. See Jim Phillips, 
Transactions, Interaction and Inaction: Industrial Democracy in the UK in the 
1970s, 18 EUR. BUS. HIST. ASS’N CONF., FRANKFURT, GER. (2008), 
http://www.ebha.org/ebha2008/papers/Phillips_ebha_2008.pdf (“Bullock’s 
remnants were duly lost amid the political, economic and industrial turbulence 
of the 1978–9 ‘Winter of Discontent’ . . . .”).  
 101. See Phillips, supra note 100, at 18–19 (“[T]he political discrediting of 
the Labour government and its defeat to Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
party in the 1979 General Election, can be traced directly to the abandonment of 
the industrial democracy agenda . . . .”). 
 102. See DEPARTMENT OF TRADE, THE CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, 
1977, Cmnd. 7037, ¶ 5 (UK) (“The statutory definition of the duty of directors 
will require directors to take into account the interests of employees as well as 
of shareholders.”). 
 103. See Companies Bill 1978, HL Bill [2 47/5] cl. 46(2) (Gr. Brit) 
Where in any proceedings it falls to a court to determine whether a 
director of a company is in breach of his duty to have regard, in the 
performance of his functions, to the interests of the company’s 
members, the court shall take into account the fact that the director 
is also required to comply with the duty imposed by this section.  
As Lord Mishcon explained in the House of Lords:  
The section was “deemed to be a shield for the directors and not a 
spear. In other words . . . if a director is criticised, indeed is attacked 
in the courts, for not having fulfilled duties to the members of the 
company solely in their interests because he has taken into account 
the interests of employees, which may slightly or substantially 
derogate in a certain case from the interests of the members, it shall 
be taken into account that the director had this statutory duty.  
407 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (1980) cols. 1017–27, at 1021–22 (UK). 
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The matters to which the directors of a company are to have 
regard in the performance of their functions include the 
interests of the company's employees in general, as well as the 
interests of its members.104 
However, the provision was weakened with the omission of the 
safe harbor provision, leaving only a duty owed to, and 
enforceable by, the company.105 The Government explained that it 
was concerned not to “open up an easy route for frivolous or 
obstructive actions in the courts,” and that it viewed the section 
as declaratory of existing best practice.106 Sealy later commented 
that the section was introduced “perhaps in an attempt to 
appease the pressure for more comprehensive reform.”107  
Section 309 did not have much impact on the wider 
landscape of corporate law. Whilst it broadened the definition of 
the “interests of the company,” giving the directors greater 
protection against shareholder claims of unfair prejudice or 
unlawful financial assistance,108 no director ever faced liability for 
failing to consider the interests of employees. Various reasons 
may be suggested for this.  
Since the duty was owed to the company, employees faced 
enforcement problems.109 In addition, there were doubts about 
                                                                                                     
 104. Companies Act 1985, c. 6, § 309(1) (repealed 2007) (UK).  
 105. See id. § 309(2) (providing that “the duty imposed by this section on the 
directors is owed by them to the company (and the company alone) and is 
enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by 
its directors”). 
 106. 972 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1979) cols. 52–160, at 62 (UK). Cecil 
Parkinson stated that the section would “confirm the care with which 
responsible boards already consider the interests of their employees and act as 
an encouragement for others to do the same.” Id.  
 107. L. S. Sealy, Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities—Problems Conceptual, 
Practical and Procedural, 13 MONASH U. L. REV. 164, 171 (1987).  
 108. The courts recognized that the directors’ duty to act in the “interests of 
the company” had been broadened by Section 309 so that “the company is more 
than just the sum total of its members.” Fulham Football Club Ltd. v. Cabra 
Estates plc [1992] 1 BCLC 363, 379 (Gr. Brit.); see also Brady v. Brady [1989] 
AC 755, 778 (UK) (describing the term “purpose” as capable of “several different 
meanings” in the Companies Act 1985 (UK)). In In re Saul D Harrison & Sons 
plc [1994] BCC 475, 483 (UK), the Court of Appeal held that the directors of a 
struggling company were lawfully entitled, among other things, to take account 
of the benefits to employees of the business continuing alongside the interest of 
the shareholders in the company becoming profitable.  
 109. The difficulties of enforcement were quickly recognized by 
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whether a remedy could realistically be ordered,110 and Villiers 
suggests that the obligation was merely procedural, requiring the 
directors to consider employee interests, but allowing them to 
disregard them where they were “not compatible with the 
company’s or shareholders’ interests.”111 Finally, as we saw 
above, the courts had long taken an approach akin to that 
embodied in the business judgment rule and rarely called into 
question the substance of corporate decision-making.112 
Beyond these important considerations, it is submitted that 
the main reason that Section 309 did not produce any meaningful 
effect on the way companies are governed was that it did not 
operate in the hostile takeover context. Unlike the corporate 
constituency statutes introduced at state level in the late 1980s, 
                                                                                                     
commentators. Prentice thought that employees would have to enforce the duty 
by becoming shareholders. See D. D. Prentice, A Company and Its Employees; 
The Companies Act 1980, 10 INDUS. L.J. 1, 4–5 (1981) (discussing shareholder 
power over directors compared to employees). Even if they became shareholders, 
they would have to contend with the complexities of the judge-made rules 
regulating the derivative action (i.e., it would be unlikely that the majority of 
independent shareholders would support an action against the directors or that 
the wrong would be unratifiable). See Prudential Assurance Co. v. Newman 
Industries (No. 2) [1982] Ch. 204, 222–23 (describing challenges individual 
shareholders face when bringing suits against directors); Smith v. Croft (No. 2) 
[1988] Ch. 114, 120 (discussing the difficulty in forming consensus between 
various groups of shareholders with divergent interests). For further discussion 
of this point, see Charlotte Villiers, Section 309 of the Companies Act 1985: Is it 
Time for a Reappraisal?, in LEGAL REGULATION OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION 
593, 596–97 (Hugh Collins, Paul Davies & Roger Rideout eds., Kluwer Law Int’l. 
2000). 
 110. Sealy recognized that this was a duty without a corresponding remedy, 
so that the section was “empty.” See Sealy, supra note 107, at 177 (asking what 
a court could “be asked to do for them, supposing that it is established that 
insufficient regard has been had to their interests”). Prentice suggested that the 
only suitable remedy appeared to be the courts ordering the directors to 
reconsider their decision, something akin to an administrative law remedy. See 
Prentice, supra note 109, at 5 (“If the action is timeous, probably the only 
remedial option open to the courts will be an order that the directors reconsider 
their decision taking into consideration the employees’ interests.”). 
111. Villiers, supra note 109, at 595–96. 
112. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text (describing historical 
latitude applied to cases involving the business judgment rule). If the decision 
was taken in good faith (which was strongly presumed), and the directors could 
show that they had had “regard to” the interests of employees, this would 
certainly suffice to exonerate them from any claim for breach of duty to the 
company. 
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which Johnson and Millon viewed as aiming “to displace the 
standard but now inadequate narrative,”113 both in the takeover 
context and beyond,114 Section 309 had no effect in relation to 
hostile takeovers, as directors’ ability to contest takeovers was 
always hamstrung. In addressing the legality of any defensive 
response to an unwelcome takeover, the common law focused on 
the purpose for which directors made decisions, and ruled 
unlawful issues of shares intended to interfere with the exercise 
of majority shareholder’s rights in a takeover context.115 Unlike 
Delaware, the common law never moved “toward a notion of 
directorial responsibility tethered to the welfare of the overall 
corporate enterprise.”116 In principle, the courts could have 
responded to the introduction of Section 309 by changing their 
approach to takeover regulation, allowing defensive measures 
intended to protect the interests of employees. However, the 
introduction of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers in 1968 
had already closed off the flow of takeover cases to the courts.117 
The City Code prohibited the directors from doing anything that 
might frustrate the offer or deny the shareholders the 
opportunity to decide on the takeover, a far wider prohibition 
                                                                                                     
113. Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate 
Law: Who’s in Control, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (1993). 
114. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 240–
48 (1991) (positing about the constituency statute’s impact on conceptions of a 
director’s duty); Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate 
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 35–47 (1992) (discussing the 
judicial application of the duty of care and the business judgment rule). 
115. See Howard Smith Ltd. . Ampol Petroleum Ltd. (1974) AC 821, 838 
(appeal taken from S.C.N.S.W.) (concluding that “it must be unconstitutional for 
directors to use their fiduciary powers over the shares in the company purely for 
the purpose of destroying an existing majority, or creating a new majority which 
did not previously exist”); Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd. (1967) Ch. 254, 268 (noting 
the directors would not be permitted to use their power “to interfere with the 
exercise by the majority of its constitutional rights”);. 
116. Johnson & Millon, supra note 113, at 1198.  
117. In an exceptional takeover case, which fell outside the scope of the City 
Code, the Scottish Court of Session ruled that the directors owed their duties to 
the company—which encompassed present and future shareholders, as well as 
employees—and not merely to the current shareholders. See Dawson Int’l plc v. 
Coats Patons plc (1988) 4 BCC 305, 313 (“[T]here appears to be no reason why 
‘members’ should hot [sic] be capable of applying to future as well as to present 
members of the company.”). 
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than that developed at common law.118 Hence, even if widening 
the definition of the interests of the company in Section 309 
theoretically may have given directors greater discretion in law to 
defend against hostile takeovers,119 this was truncated in practice 
by the City Code, which drew its force not from law, but from the 
City of London’s self-regulatory capacity, with those who violated 
its provisions denied access to financial services in the future.120  
Accordingly, Section 309 remained, at best, as a source of 
legitimation of any stakeholder management practices which had 
survived the rise of the hostile takeover,121 and, at worst, a mere 
“window-dressing.”122 For Sealy, it was “either one of the most 
incompetent or one of the most cynical pieces of drafting on 
record.”123 The section proclaimed that UK corporate law had a 
wider scope, but, as a permissive provision, was effectively 
redundant in practice because the forces of the wider corporate 
governance system created ever greater pressure to prioritize the 
short-term interests of shareholders. 
Following this change, the early 1980s saw a recession and 
political pressure for industrial democracy abated,124 whilst trade 
                                                                                                     
118. For further discussion of the way in which the City Code superseded 
the common law, see generally Andrew Johnston, Takeover Regulation: 
Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422 
(2007) (theorizing about the origins and purpose behind the advent of the City 
Codes, specifically the prohibition on defensive measures).  
119. For a discussion of the approach the courts might have taken where 
directors sought to defend a defensive issue of shares on the basis that this was 
in the interests of the employees, see Prentice, supra note 109, at 3–4 (arguing 
that directors may be able to “fend off a take-over claiming that that they were 
acting out of consideration for the welfare of the company’s employees”). 
120. See Johnston, supra note 118, at 443 (detailing the current prohibition 
on defensive measures in the London City Code).  
121. For discussion of this in the context of US corporate constituency 
statutes, see Orts, supra note 114, at 44 (providing support for the influence of 
corporate constituency statutes in legitimating business decisions).  
122. John Birds, Making Directors Do Their Duties, 1 COMPANY LAW. 67, 73 
(1980). 
123. Sealy, supra note 107, at 177.  
124. Wedderburn, supra note 74, at 40 (“[T]he savage onslaught of the 
recession stifled—whether temporarily or not we cannot know—the debate 
about ‘industrial democracy’.”); see also Lord Wedderburn, Trust, Corporation 
and the Worker, 23 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 203, 249 (1985) (“When an economy, like 
the British, is turned geriatric . . . the maximisation of profit leaves little space 
for social experiment.”).  
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unions were progressively weakened under the Thatcher 
government. It was during this period that companies began to 
embrace CSR in earnest,125 but the scope of company law 
remained undisturbed until the Company Law Review process 
which took place over a number of years at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. 
V. The 2006 Reforms 
The review process that led to the 2006 reforms was led by a 
Company Law Review Steering Group (CLRSG). The review was 
unique in the long history of UK company law reviews in that it 
began by consulting the public on the “scope” of company law, and 
explicitly setting out its guiding assumptions about the purpose 
of companies. Whilst CSR was not discussed, the “enlightened 
shareholder value” (ESV) approach adopted by the CLRSG 
implicitly assumes that corporations will be pushed by 
reputational considerations to behave in a socially responsible 
manner.126 The 2006 reforms were introduced at the high point of 
political belief in the capacity of markets to self-regulate and to 
steer business towards the public good, with the “great 
moderation” coming to an abrupt end shortly afterwards with the 
onset of the global financial crisis. 
The CLRSG began from the position that, under the existing 
law, “[c]ompanies are formed and managed for the benefit of 
shareholders,” subject to safeguards for creditors, and with 
“public disclosure of information” operating “for the benefit of the 
community as a whole.”127 Easterbrook and Fischel were cited as 
providing the main economic justification for shareholders’ 
ultimate control of the undertaking in the form of shareholders 
                                                                                                     
125. See Daniel Kinderman, ‘Free Us up so We Can Be Responsible!’ The 
Co-Evolution of Corporate Social Responsibility and Neo-Liberalism in the UK, 
1977–2010, 10 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 29, 29 (2012) (“As power shifted away from 
unions and to employers, some prominent businessmen committed themselves 
to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).”).  
126. See COMPANY L. REV. STEERING GRP., MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A 
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK §§ 5.1.12, 17–23 (1999) 
[hereinafter CLRSG, THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK] (outlining the enlightened 
shareholder value approach). 
127. Id. § 5.1.4.  
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having “greatest exposure to residual risk as a result of 
mismanagement . . . and are therefore best qualified to ensure 
proper stewardship.”128 
The CLRSG contrasted ESV with two alternatives: (1) an 
“exclusive focus on the short-term bottom line”; and (2) pluralism, 
under which company law would require companies “to serve a 
wider range of interests, not subordinate to, or as a means of 
achieving, shareholder value . . . but as valid in their own 
right.”129 Whilst the review rehearsed arguments akin to those of 
team production theory,130 and in particular the issue of 
firm-specific investments,131 it, like Blair and Stout, concluded 
that company law could facilitate these developments without 
radical change. ESV would “provide an adequate environment for 
the development of such relationships,”132 whilst the normal 
bargaining process is not “incapable of generating appropriate 
safeguards.”133 Furthermore, any “deficiencies in this area . . . are 
best made good by changes in other areas of the law and public 
policy.”134 Pluralism, in contrast, would threaten to undermine 
accountability and “dangerously distract management into a 
political balancing style at the expense of economic growth and 
international competitiveness.”135 After public consultation, 
pluralism was ultimately rejected on the basis that a “very 
substantial majority of responses (in number and in weight) 
favored retaining the basic rule that directors should operate 
companies for the benefit of members (ie normally shareholders),” 
                                                                                                     
128. Id. at 34 n.23.  
129. Id. §§ 5.1.12–13.  
130. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in 
Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743 (1999) (reviewing 
team production theory).  
131. CLRSG, THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra note 126, § 5.1.24 (“The 
pluralist view asserts that present law . . . fails to cater for these considerations, 
because such firm-specific investments are best regarded as assets of the 
company . . . distinct from its members.”).  
132. Id. § 5.1.25.  
133. Id. § 5.1.26.  
134. Id. § 5.1.27. For a thorough critique of this argument, and the 
assumption that “corporate law . . . is a residuary or ‘default’ intellectual field, 
taking up only (and all of) what is not dealt with elsewhere,” see Johnson, supra 
note 8, at 1718. 
135. CLRSG, THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra note 126, § 5.1.28.  
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although “there was also very strong support for the view that 
this needed to be framed in an ‘inclusive’ way.”136 Similarly, a 
“substantial majority” accepted the arguments against pluralism 
and opposed empowering directors to “set interests of others 
above those of shareholders.”137 
Having decided to implement ESV, the CLRSG recommended 
a number of changes, including: (1) “an obligation on directors to 
achieve the success of the company for the benefit of shareholders 
by taking proper account of all the relevant considerations for 
that purpose”138 (an “inclusive” duty which ultimately became 
Section 172 CA 2006); (2) an obligation for large companies to 
produce an Operating and Financial Review, which would provide 
qualitative and “forward looking” information to the markets, 
enabling them to assess the strategies adopted by the company 
and the prospect of them being achieved;139 and (3) flexibility to 
allow companies to define scope and purposes and, therefore, the 
objectives of shareholders.140 The group hinted that reputation 
would bridge the gap between ESV and pluralism,141 claiming 
that the “overall objective should be pluralist in the sense that 
companies should be run in a way which maximizes overall 
competitiveness and wealth and welfare for all,” but without 
“turning company directors from business decision makers into 
moral, political or economic arbiters.”142 So in the end, there was 
no significant change to company law. This was unsurprising 
because, as Wedderburn noted in 1985, the argument that taking 
account of a wider range of interests would produce long-term 
                                                                                                     
136. COMPANY L. REV. STEERING GRP., MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A 
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK § 2.11 (2000) [hereinafter 
CLRSG, DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK].  
137. Id. § 2.12.  
138. Id. § 2.19.  
139. See id. §§ 5.77–79 (discussing recommendations for the provision of 
qualitative information by big companies to better inform markets).  
140. See id. § 2.19 (providing that while directors would be under a duty to 
obey the constitution, a wide statement of purpose would still not allow the 
directors to prefer the interests of other constituencies over those of 
shareholders). 
141. See id. at 14 n.8 (citing the Chairman and CEO of Shell UK Ltd’s 
prediction that reputation could be the “missing link” between ESV and 
pluralism).  
142. Id. § 2.21.  
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shareholder value was “the customary British route to a 
gentlemanly silence on the problem.”143 
The effect of Section 172 is to require that decisions are 
motivated by the directors’ honest beliefs that they will benefit 
the shareholders,144 whilst the directors should “have regard” to 
those other interests and considerations (whether listed or not) 
which will produce the best result for the shareholders. Section 
172, for the first time, enshrined shareholder primacy explicitly 
in law.145 Prior to the 2006 Act, as noted above, many 
commentators understood the “interests of the company” to refer 
to the interests of the shareholders collectively.146 For them, 
Section 172 was simply a codification of the existing law. So, for 
example, Keay concludes that the section is not fit for its 
purpose—to ensure that directors run companies for long-term 
prosperity rather than just for short term gains—since it merely 
reflects, and does no more, than the previous law.147 However, if, 
                                                                                                     
143. Wedderburn, supra note 74, at 11.  
144. The CLR rejected omitting a reference to the interests of “members” in 
Section 172 because “it would allow directors a discretionary power to set any 
interest above that of shareholders whenever their view of what constitutes ‘the 
company’s success’ required it.” CLRSG, DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK, supra 
note 136, § 3.52; see also Andrew Keay, Moving Toward Stakeholderism? 
Constituency Statutes, Enlightened Shareholder Value, and More: Much Ado 
About Little?, 22 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1, 31 (2011) (“With directors having greater 
discretion . . . directors might resist claims of breach of duty on the basis that 
what they did was based on a consideration of the interests of one or more 
constituencies that are mentioned in section 172.”). 
145. See Talbot, supra note 10, at 515 (asserting that section 172 provides a 
“bald shareholder primacy norm”). Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England 
comments that “for the first time in history, shareholder primacy had been 
hard-wired into companies’ statutory purposes.” See generally Andrew Haldane, 
Chief Economist, Bank of Eng., Who Owns a Company?, Speech at the 
University of Edinburgh Corporate Finance Conference 9 (May 22, 2015), 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech8
33.pdf.  
146. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing previous notions 
of company duty).  
147. See Andrew Keay, The Duty to Promote the Success of the Company: Is 
It Fit for Purpose? 13 (Univ. of Leeds Sch. of Law, Ctr. for Bus. Law & Practice, 
Working Paper, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-
id=1662411 (“If all [Section] 172 does is to reflect the previous duty it is not fit 
for purpose as the Government had expectations that the section would achieve 
more than the previous duty did.”).  
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as suggested above, the “interests of the company” was never 
clearly defined in the context of directors’ duties,148 then this was 
a more significant change because the law became narrower and 
stricter. Although Section 172 does provide directors with 
guidance as to how to run the company in a way that is likely to 
produce returns for shareholders in the longer term,149 they now 
have a clear and unequivocal, legally-binding mandate that 
shareholder interests must take priority.150 
However, the importance of this change should not be 
overstated for two reasons. First, the change is probably more 
important on a rhetorical and ideological level than in terms of 
enforcement. In principle, a decision which benefits one or more 
stakeholder groups at the expense of the shareholders could be 
challenged in court by one or more shareholders via a derivative 
action, although this would be unlikely to succeed, both because 
of the long standing implicit business judgment rule protecting 
good faith decisions (in other words the directors could argue that 
favoring the stakeholder group was simply an aspect of a longer 
term strategy intended to produce benefits for the shareholders), 
and because it would be very difficult for a complaining 
shareholder to prove loss to the company for which the director is 
responsible (the courts recognize that directors are hired to take 
business risks in order to produce returns for the shareholders).  
Second, like the original common law and Section 309 before 
it, Section 172 will do little—if anything—to insulate directors 
against the pressures from the wider corporate governance 
system, or to steer them towards longer-term decision-making.151 
                                                                                                     
148. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text (describing the historic 
ambiguity of the term “interests of the company”). 
149. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1)(a)–(f) (UK) (listing 
considerations directors should make when promoting the success of their 
companies).  
150. See id. § 172(1) (“A director of a company must act in the way he 
considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole . . . .”). 
151. This danger was exacerbated by the abandonment of the Operating and 
Financial Review, which was supposed to provide the markets with better 
information in order to give directors the scope to take a long-term view, and its 
replacement with a watered down Business Review and then Strategic Report. 
See generally Andrew Johnston, After the OFR: Will UK Shareholder Value Still 
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Although both the 2006 reforms and the 2010 soft law 
Stewardship Code152 are premised upon the assumption that 
shareholders will steer companies towards a long-term approach, 
there are signs that, at present, shareholder engagement is 
actually having the opposite effect. As Millon points out, the 
chase for yield since the financial crisis means that institutional 
shareholders, which conventionally assumed returns of around 
8% in order to meet their liabilities, are increasing pressure on 
managers to maximize quarterly returns.153 Dallas shows how 
financial firms may put pressure on corporate management to 
increase payouts to shareholders either by their trading 
activities, which put pressure on market prices, or by the “use, or 
threatened use, of their shareholder voting power.”154 To make 
matters worse, the institutional investors with the longest time 
frames—pension funds and insurance companies—have been 
divesting from equities in favor of alternative investments such 
as hedge funds and private equity, both of which take a more 
activist approach to scrutinizing management, but prioritize 
short term returns.155 This creates a danger that the reforms 
since 2006 will actually result in greater short-termism and 
further reduce the willingness of corporations voluntarily to 
                                                                                                     
Be Enlightened?, 7 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 817 (2006) (discussing the rationale 
for and abandonment of the Operating and Financial Review). 
152. The Stewardship Code aims to encourage shareholders to engage with 
the companies in which they own shares “to promote the long term success of 
companies in such a way that the ultimate providers of capital also prosper.” 
FIN. REPORTING COUNCIL, THE UK STEWARDSHIP CODE 1 (2010, rev. 2012). 
153. See David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 911, 931 (2013) (“To meet their current obligations, public pension funds 
have historically assumed an annual rate of return of 8% . . . .”). 
154. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and 
Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 264, 306–09 (2012) (detailing the use of 
nonfinancial firms as “arbitrage opportunities” via threats of the exercise of 
shareholder power). 
155. See OECD Business and Finance Outlook 2015, ORG. FOR ECON. 
CO-OPERATION & DEV. 120–21 (2015), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/finance-and-investment/oecd-business-and-finance-outlook-
2015_9789264234291-en#.WNMQa4QppPU (last visited May 1, 2017) (showing 
that UK institutional investors have, since 2008, been divesting equity holdings 
and investing in “other” assets such as private equity, derivatives and 
structured products in a “search for yield”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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embrace social responsibility and address the social costs their 
activities create.  
Decisions that do not contribute to short-term shareholder 
value and that directors cannot justify in dialogue with 
shareholders either informally or in general meeting will be 
sanctioned by declining share prices, resulting in foregone 
bonuses and the threat of hostile takeover. We saw above that, 
both under the original common law and under Section 309, 
which broadened the notion of the “interests of the company,” it 
was arguably permissible for directors to take decisions that 
benefitted employees over shareholders.156 However, both the 
original common law and Section 309 were deprived of most of 
their utility in terms of reinforcing managerial discretion because 
markets asserted control over managers following the 1948 
reforms.157 Likewise, Section 172 is unlikely to have much effect 
in the context of a form of corporate governance that incentivizes 
and threatens corporate directors to prioritize the short-term 
financial interests of shareholders. For example, in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis, it is difficult to argue that Section 172 
played any meaningful role in constraining short-termism on the 
part of directors, or limiting the possible impacts on third parties. 
Shareholders pushed for more risk-taking on the part of banks, 
and highly incentivized executives were only too happy to 
oblige.158 As policymakers appear to be committed to addressing 
the perceived problem of short-termism by further empowering 
shareholders, Section 172 will become even less relevant as 
shareholders exercise greater direct and indirect influence over 
executives.159 
                                                                                                     
156. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (arguing that unsettled case 
law may have allowed for a wider notion of company interests). 
157. See discussion supra Part III (detailing the 1948 company law reforms).  
158. See Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, 
at 10 (Feb. 5, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/ 
/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf (“[S]hareholders’ pressure on management to 
deliver higher share prices and dividends for investors meant that exceeding 
expected quarterly earnings became the benchmark . . . .”). 
159. Since the financial crisis, the UK has witnessed the introduction of the 
Stewardship Code, a soft law initiative, which seeks to encourage shareholder 
engagement with companies. Supra note 152. In addition, a binding shareholder 
vote on companies’ executive pay policies was introduced. See Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013 § 79(4) (UK) (inserting § 439A into the Companies 
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The reformed UK law stands in marked contrast to the 
position under US law—argued by Johnson and Millon—that the 
Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby provides a “highly persuasive if 
not authoritative” opinion that state law is permissive.160 
Therefore, “such avowed goals as social justice, environmental 
concerns, and employee welfare . . . are valid ends in themselves, 
not merely means toward the goal of profits.”161 In contrast to 
changes in US state law that permit or require directors to 
consider wider interests, Section 172 explicitly fixes shareholder 
primacy as the goal of companies, restricting managerial 
discretion and legitimating the wider social norm that managers 
should maximize shareholder value.162 As a result of the changes 
during the course of the twentieth century, which culminated in 
Section 172, CSR is now confined to practices that are acceptable 
to the shareholders and the capital markets. Companies’ CSR 
practices have of course long reflected this, with companies 
                                                                                                     
Act 2006); see also Companies Act 2006 § 439A (UK) (requiring shareholders to 
approve, by ordinary resolution, the directors’ remuneration policy as detailed in 
Directors’ Remuneration Report). Most recently, on December 16th, 2016, 
agreement was reached within the EU on revisions to the Shareholder Rights’ 
Directive, requiring companies to develop binding pay policies for executives, to 
be approved by the shareholders. The policy must “contribute to the business 
strategy, long-term interests and sustainability of the company and explain how 
it does so.” European Scrutiny Committee, Proposal for a Directive Amending 
Directive 2007/36 as Regards the Encouragement of Long-Term Shareholder 
Engagement and Directive 2013/34 as Regards Certain Elements of the 
Corporate Governance Statement, COM (14) 213 (Mar. 3, 2017), 
https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmeuleg/71-
xxxi/7115.htm. At the time of going to press, the full text of the Directive was 
not publicly available, but for a summary see European Council Press Release 
738/16, ‘Shareholders' rights in EU companies: Presidency strikes deal with 
Parliament’ (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/12/16-shareholders-rights-eu-companies/. For further background 
on the revisions to the Shareholder Rights Directive, see FRANK BOLD, 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS DIRECTIVE POLICY BRIEF (2016), 
http://www.purposeofcorporation.org/documents/briefing-shareholder-rights-
directive.pdf. 
160. Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 22 (2015).  
161. Id.  
162. See Companies Act 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (UK) (“A director of a company 
must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote 
the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole . . . .”).  
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producing glossy CSR reports that pay little attention to impacts 
and are more akin to “impression management.” 
VI. Conclusion: The Prospects for CSR 
This Article has shown that changes to company law since 
1948, and the changes to corporate governance that followed, 
have gradually reduced the scope for managerial-led CSR 
initiatives. More recently, however, CSR has come to be viewed in 
policy and academic debates as a means of governance of 
economic activity in pursuit of both economic efficiency and social 
justice. This can be seen most starkly in the European 
Commission’s changing definition of CSR, which moved from 
purely voluntary action on the part of companies intended to 
make the world a better place163 to action by companies to 
address their impacts on society.164 These developments are 
important conceptually, not least because a focus on impacts 
ensures the “relevance” of CSR activities165 and avoids the 
critique that managers who engage in charitable or philanthropic 
CSR are imposing agency costs on shareholders by “not 
spend[ing] the profits on CSR in precisely the way that equity 
holders would have spent them.”166 Moreover, a focus on 
externalities provides a clear economic efficiency rationale for 
                                                                                                     
163. See Commission Green Paper on Promoting a European Framework for 
Corporate Social Responsibility, at 8, COM (2001) 366 final, (July 18, 2001) 
(defining CSR as “a concept whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction 
with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis”).  
164. See A Renewed EU Strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Communication from the Commission, at 3, COM (2011) 681 final (Oct. 25, 
2011) (referring to CSR as “the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on 
society,” and requiring that corporations “have in place a process to integrate 
social, environmental, ethical, human rights and consumer concerns into their 
business operations and core strategy”). 
165. See Donna J. Wood, Corporate Social Performance Revisited, 16 ACAD. 
MGMT. REV. 691, 698 (1991) (“[P]ublic responsibility can be translated into a 
broader rule of relevance.”).  
 166. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economic Context of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTOR’S LIABILITIES 55, 61 
(Klaus J. Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., De Gruyter 1985); see also Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Corporate Social Responsibility: Comments on the Legal and Economic 
Context of a Continuing Debate, 3 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 114, 124 (1984).  
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CSR.167 However, they also suffer from a significant omission: 
they are silent on the question of when companies should address 
their impacts. There is no discussion of the distinction between 
“ethical” and “strategic” CSR,168 or, to put it more bluntly, there 
is no guidance as to what companies should do where there is no 
“business case” for internalizing an externality. The closest thing 
to guidance to be found in the various policy documents is 
contained in ISO 26000, which suggests that companies should 
internalize their impacts where society expects them to do this, 
and that successful companies are socially responsible.169 In 
other words, companies will be steered by markets to internalize 
their externalities to an appropriate extent, leaving us squarely 
within the realms of the “business case” for CSR.170 
This failure to discuss the limits of corporate responsibility 
for impacts may be pragmatic, with policymakers keen not to 
deter corporations from the impact agenda by emphasizing the 
possibility of profit sacrifice. Likewise, CSR is no longer a matter 
for management alone: the legal and policy changes during the 
second half of the twentieth century progressively empowered 
shareholders and became a key limiter of CSR activities. Rather 
than a legal distinction between “ethical” and “strategic” CSR, it 
is suggested that the key distinction in practice is now between 
CSR practices that empowered shareholders will tolerate, and 
those that they will not tolerate.  
                                                                                                     
 167. See, e.g., Andrew Johnston, Facing Up to Social Cost: The Real 
Meaning of Corporate Social Responsibility, 20 GRIFFITH L. REV. 221, 239 (2011) 
(arguing that voluntary identification and internalization of externalities is 
another way of governing them, alongside taxes, regulation and Coasean 
bargaining). For a more sceptical view of the usefulness of the externality 
concept, see generally Claire A. Hill, The Rhetoric of Negative Externalities, 39 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 517 (2016) (asserting that there are serious questions as to 
how it should be operationalized).  
 168. Johnson & Millon, supra note 6, at 30 (assessing the various 
motivations behind a corporation’s interest in CSR).  
 169. See ISO 26000—Social Responsibility, INTERNAL ORG. FOR 
STANDARDIZATION, http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/iso26000.htm (last 
visited May 1, 2017) (“Business and organization do not operate in a vacuum. 
Their relationship to the society and environment in which they operate is a 
critical factor in their ability to continue to operate effectively.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 170. See Andrew Johnston, ISO 26000: Guiding Companies to Sustainability 
Through Social Responsibility?, 9 EUR. COMPANY L. 110, 117 (2012) (evaluating 
the ISO’s focus on “business benefits” as a way to encourage CSR).  
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Looking at the practice of large corporations, it appears that 
shareholders will tolerate CSR activities that are either 
inexpensive, or that managers can credibly claim will result in 
direct benefits to shareholders (perhaps because they are a core 
part of the strategy or because there is a clearly perceived 
reputational benefit to a particular corporation),171 or, ideally, 
both. Beyond this, there is not much scope for CSR that reduces 
profitability in order to internalize externalities. This has long 
been recognized by economists, who argue that a corporation that 
wants to engage in CSR activities, but is operating in competitive 
markets, facing the same cost functions as its competitors and 
elastic demand for its products, will have to “either raise its 
prices, and face a drastic decline in demand for its products, or it 
must reduce the returns to capital or labor.”172 Consumers may be 
willing to pay a higher price for a product that is marketed on the 
basis of its CSR characteristics, although the evidence is that this 
willingness is patchy.173 Moreover, with households highly 
indebted, inflation barely above zero in many Western economies, 
and myriad products competing for spare household cash flow, it 
seems unlikely that CSR will expand on the basis of consumer 
market pressure. With returns to labor slashed during the long 
period of offshoring of production that has characterized 
globalization since the 1980s, there is little scope for companies to 
address their social and environment impacts by further cutting 
returns to labor. As a result of the reforms discussed in this 
Article, companies are under considerable market pressure to 
maximize shareholder value, making it very difficult to reduce to 
returns to shareholders in the absence of far-reaching reforms to 
the scope of corporate law and takeover regulation. Similarly, 
returns to senior executives might be reduced, but this seems 
unlikely without significant reforms to the composition of 
remuneration committees. 
                                                                                                     
 171. See Johnston, supra note 167, at 222 (describing the “business case for 
CSR” as promoting a “win-win” in which “corporations are seen as ‘doing good,’” 
thereby enhancing their reputation).  
 172. Mashaw, supra note 166, at 60. 
 173. See DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE 47–49 (2005) (detailing the 
tension between a consumer’s desire to contribute to socially responsible 
companies and their desire to purchase more affordable products).  
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The result is that CSR has effectively been reduced to either 
a marketing or defensive exercise,174 and cannot become either a 
comprehensive mechanism for governing externalities175 or even 
a credible means of legitimating corporate capitalism in the face 
of its impacts on society.176 This leads to the pessimistic 
conclusion that, under current political economic conditions (i.e., 
quantitative easing, zero interest rate policy, household 
indebtedness, large pension fund liabilities and activist 
shareholders), companies will not voluntarily take decisions 
which further sustainability. Hence, there is a pressing need to 
identify the “countervailing forces” that will create pressure for 
true social responsibility.177 A broader mandate to consider 
sustainability in decision-making,178 coupled with wider powers of 
appointment and representation on corporate boards, would be 
one way of steering companies towards taking account of the 
social and environmental costs of their activities. 
What, then, is the prospect of reforms in the UK that would 
steer companies towards greater social responsibility? Until 
                                                                                                     
 174. See Marc T. Jones, Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Critique of the 
Social Responsibility Concept and Discourse, 35 BUS. & SOC’Y 7, 29 (1996) 
(describing corporate CSR budgets as funding activities which are “essentially 
high-profile public relations advertisements that the organization uses to 
differentiate itself from its competitors and pre-empt government regulations”). 
 175. As Reich put it, capital markets are “notoriously impatient, and are 
becoming less patient all the time. Most of today’s institutional investors have 
no particular interest in a ‘long term’ that extends much beyond the next 
quarter, if that long.” Robert B. Reich, The New Meaning of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 40 CAL. MGMT. REV. 1, 12 (1998).  
 176. See Wood, supra note 165, at 695–96 (exploring the principle behind 
societal grants of “legitimacy” on businesses); Jones, supra note 174, at 7–8 
(discussing a capitalist society’s need to justify negative externalities in the 
market place).  
 177. See Jones, supra note 174, at 34 (“[T]o propose that business 
organization will behave in a socially responsible manner as the result of 
external pressure . . . is a very different, more theoretically plausible and 
empirically sustainable position.”). 
 178. See Beate Sjåfjell, Andrew Johnston, Linn Anker-Sørensen & David 
Millon, Shareholder Primacy: the Main Barrier to Sustainable Companies, in 
COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 126, 
146–47 (Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin J. Richardson eds., 2015) (“[N]ational 
companies acts should state that the societal purpose of companies is to create 
sustainable value within the planetary boundaries. Such a redefined purpose of 
companies would need to be operationalised through integration of such a goal 
into the duties of the board.”). 
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recently, there was little likelihood of such a change, with the 
“classic argument” for single constituency accountability holding 
a firm grip on policymakers, despite its “bracketing” effects. 
However, this Article can end on a positive note by pointing to 
tentative signs of change in the wake of the UK’s referendum 
decision to leave the European Union. Surprisingly, given its 
historical opposition to the EU’s attempts to widen the scope of 
corporate governance, the UK is now considering far-reaching 
changes to corporate governance, including the reconstitution of 
boards and remuneration committees to include employee 
representatives. During her campaign to become Prime Minister 
in the aftermath of Brexit, Theresa May stated, “I want to see 
changes in the way that big business is governed . . . . So if I’m 
Prime Minister, we’re going to change that system—and we’re 
going to have not just consumers represented on company boards, 
but employees as well.”179 An initial Parliamentary inquiry was 
launched in September 2016,180 and the new Prime Minister 
announced that plans to put both consumers and workers on 
boards would be published before the end of the year.181 However, 
this commitment was withdrawn shortly afterwards.182 A Green 
                                                                                                     
 179. Theresa May, Member of Parliament, HOUSE OF COMMONS, We Can 
Make Britain a Country that Works for Everyone (July 11, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 180. See Corporate Government Inquiry Launched, COMMONS SELECT COMM. 
(Sep. 16, 2016), http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-
z/commons-select/business-innovation-and-skills/news-parliament-
2015/corporate-governance-inquiry-launch-16-17/ (last visited May 1, 2017) 
(“The . . . Committee has today launched an inquiry on corporate governance, 
focussing [sic] on executive pay, directors duties, and the composition of 
boardrooms, including worker representation and gender balance in executive 
positions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also 
Corporate Governance Inquiry—Publications, PARLIAMENT, 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/ 
business-energy-industrial-strategy/inquiries/parliament-2015/corporate-gover 
nance-inquiry/publications/ (last visited May 1, 2017) (tracking the responses to 
the consultation) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 181. See Theresa May, Prime Minister, U.K., Keynote Speech at 
Conservative Party Conference (Oct. 5, 2016). 
 182.  Theresa May, Keynote Speech to Confederation of British Industry 
(Nov. 21, 2016) (“While it is important that the voices of workers and consumers 
should be represented, I can categorically tell you that this is not about 
mandating works councils, or the direct appointment of workers or trade union 
representatives on boards . . . .”); see also Helen Warrell & Jim Pickard, Plan for 
UK to Put Workers on Company Boards Falters, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016), 
THE SHRINKING SCOPE OF CSR 1041 
Paper on Corporate Governance Reform followed in November 
2016, 183 canvassing, among other things, different possibilities 
for the representation of stakeholder interests within corporate 
governance, including “stakeholder advisory panels,”184 
designating non-executive directors “to ensure that the voices of 
key interested groups, especially that of employees, is [sic] being 
heard at board level,”185 and strengthening reporting 
requirements.186 However, direct stakeholder representation on 
boards would remain a voluntary matter, with the Government 
“not proposing mandate the direct appointment of employees or 
other interested parties to company boards.”187  
In brief, post-Brexit, and following other recent scandals that 
have undermined public trust in the way large companies are 
governed,188 UK corporate governance policy is now highly 
unpredictable. The current status quo is unlikely to persist, and 
limited reforms that broaden the scope of corporate law now look 
possible. Reforms that embed wider social responsibilities in law 
would represent a marked improvement on the current 
                                                                                                     
https://www.ft.com/content/22128636-9ece-11e6-891e-abe238dee8e2 (last visited 
May 1, 2017) (reporting that ministers are “looking at ways to water down 
Theresa May’s pledge”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 183. See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM, GREEN PAPER, supra note 17, at 
34–42.  
  184. Id.at 38–39. 
 185. Id. at 39–40. 
 186. Id. at 40–41. 
 187. Id. at 40. 
 188. To give two recent examples, BHS, a privately-held chain of clothing 
stores, failed in June 2016 with a pension fund deficit of £571m. See Mark 
Vandevelde & Kate Allen, Philip Green Pays £363m into Stricken BHS Pension 
Fund, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d62e97d0-fdc5-
11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30 (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). Sports Direct, a chain of listed sports apparel stores 
admitted using “potentially oppressive” workplace practices, and, under 
considerable political pressure, agreed voluntarily to put an employee 
representative on the board. See Nathalie Thomas, Sports Direct Admits some 
Work Policies are “Potentially Oppressive”, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://www.ft.com/content/6b10a343-cb80-3c98-b4e2-4607ad3437a9 (last visited 
May 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Mark 
Vandevelde, Sports Direct to Appoint Worker Representative to Board, FIN. 
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d4d713ca-04ab-11e7-ace0-
1ce02ef0def9 (last visited May 1 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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constrained voluntarist approach to CSR. They would make it 
more likely that companies will take greater responsibility for the 
impacts on society, reversing some of the legal changes that, since 
1948, have greatly reduced the scope of CSR. 
